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Introduction	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  individual	  households	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  borrow	  funds	  if	  they	  need	  to	  do	  so;	  other	  households	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  offer	  their	  surplus	  funds	  to	  the	  financial	  markets.	  These	  simple	  freedoms	  hide	  the	  fundamental	  reality	  that	  these	  two	  types	  of	  households	  are	  in	  an	  unequal	  financial	  position.	  Borrowing	  means	  that	  future	  income	  levels	  will	  be	  needed	  and	  used	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  debt	  levels.	  Savings	  means	  that	  additional	  income	  out	   of	   savings	   is	   added	   to	   income	   levels	   in	   future.	   The	   borrowing	   households,	   nearly	  always	   the	   lower	   and	  middle-­‐income	   classes,	   face	   the	   loss	   of	   their	   homes	   or	   seriously	  reduced	  income	  levels	  if	  they	  can	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  debts.	  The	  saving	  households,	  usually	  the	  better	  off	  classes,	  might	  see	  their	  income	  out	  of	  savings	  reduced,	  when	  economic	  times	  become	  tougher,	  but	  face	  less	  risks	  over	  their	  principal	  income.	  	  In	   this	   paper	   over	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2008,	   the	   actual	  mortgage	   lending	   patterns	   of	  U.S.	  banks,	   including	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddy	  Mac,	  have	  been	  studied.	  Such	  patterns	   reflect	  the	   supply	   side	   of	   money	   for	   this	   particular	   use.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   paper	   has	  elaborated	  on	  a	  “need	  for	  funds”	  approach.	  This	  need	  for	  funds	  reflects	  the	  demand	  side	  of	  funds	  based	  on	  two	  factors:	  the	  physical	  need	  for	  shelter	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  ability	  to	  repay	   outstanding	   mortgages	   out	   of	   current	   income	   levels.	   The	   U.S.	   needs	   about	   1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  annually.	  The	  mortgage	  borrowers	  need	  to	  see	  their	  income	  growth	  more	  or	  less	  in	  line	  with	  house	  price	  developments	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  debt	  servicing.	  	  The	   supply	   side	   of	  mortgage	   funds,	   represented	   by	   the	   banking	   and	   financial	  markets	  sectors,	   is	  based	  on	  different	  parameters	  than	  for	  the	  demand	  side.	  For	  the	  supply	  side	  the	  availability	  of	   funds,	   the	  profit	  motive,	  competition	  and	  regulatory	  controls	  are	   the	  most	  important.	  	  	  Regretfully,	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2007,	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  supply	  side	  overwhelmed	  the	  “need	   for	   funds”	  approach.	  More	  mortgage	   lending	  can	  create	  more	  homes	  being	  built,	  but	   it	  can	  also	   force	  house	  prices	  up	   faster	   than	  the	   income	  growth	   levels	  of	   the	   lower	  and	  median	  income	  classes.	  The	  financial	  regulators	  did	  not	  see	  this	  as	  a	  threat	  until	   it	  was	  too	  late.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  power	  had	  swung	  too	  strongly	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  banks,	  rather	  than	   to	   the	   borrowers.	   The	   supply	  motives	   drove	   the	   equilibrium	   further	   and	   further	  away	  until	  breaking	  point.	  	  In	  future,	  one	  may	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  “need	  for	  funds”	  approach	  prevails	  over	  the	  supply	  side.	  	  As	   this	  was	   not	   done,	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   were	   devastating.	   22.1	  million	  households	   faced	   foreclosure	   proceedings	   over	   the	   period	   2006-­‐2013	   or	   one	   in	   six	  households.	   5.8	  million	   homes	  were	   repossessed.	   Between	   January	   2008	   and	   October	  2009	  7.8	  million	   individuals	   lost	   their	   jobs.	   In	  2013	  median	  households	   incomes	  were	  8%	  lower	  in	  real	  terms	  than	  in	  2007.	  The	  government	  added	  an	  extra	  $7.7	  trillion	  to	  its	  debts	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis.	   The	   Fed	   bought	   about	   $4.2	   trillion	   in	  government	  bonds	  and	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities.	  Mortgage	  borrowers	  repaid	  on	  a	  net	  basis	  $1.24	  trillion	  of	  their	  outstanding	  mortgages	  over	  the	  period	  2008	  to	  first	  quarter	  2015.	  The	  future	  is	  not	  all	  bleak.	  Unemployment	  rates	  are	  substantially	  down.	  Median	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1.	  The	  free	  market	  philosophy	  
	  
1.1	  The	  free	  market	  principles	  
	  A	   free	  market	   is	  defined	  as	  a	   system	   in	  which	   the	  prices	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  are	   set	  freely	  by	   consent	  between	  buyers	  and	   sellers.	  The	   system	   is	   supposed	   to	  be	   free	   from	  any	  intervention	  by	  a	  government,	  price	  setting	  monopoly	  or	  other	  authority.	  	  A	   free	   market	   economy	   is	   a	   market-­‐based	   economy,	   whereby	   prices	   of	   goods	   and	  services	   are	   set	   freely	   by	   the	   forces	   of	   supply	   and	   demand	   and	   are	   allowed	   to	   reach	  equilibrium	  without	  intervention	  by	  government	  policy.	  	  
1.2	  Money	  and	  the	  free	  market	  principles	  
	  Rather	  than	  observing	  worldwide	  differences,	  this	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.	  individual	  households	  are	  free	  to	  borrow	  money	  as	  well	  as	  free	  to	  save	  surplus	  funds.	   In	   this	   one	   sentence	   the	   money	   contradiction	   clearly	   appears.	   The	   households	  wishing	  to	  borrow	  funds	  are	  different	  households	  from	  those	  that	  offer	  surplus	  funds	  to	  the	  market.	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  households	  wishing	  to	  borrow	  have	  to	  compete	  for	  savings	  with	   the	   largest	  borrower	  of	   all:	   the	  U.S.	   government.	  They	  also	  have	   to	   compete	  with	  companies,	  as	   the	   latter	  require	  substantial	   financial	  resources	  to	  run	  their	  operations.	  Furthermore	  the	  U.S.	  dollar	  is	  widely	  used	  by	  borrowers	  and	  savers	  outside	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	   markets	   for	   the	   supply	   and	   demand	   for	   money	   are	   distorted	   in	   that	   many	  intermediaries	  exist	  and	  a	   lot	  of	  complex	  financial	  products	  have	  been	  developed.	  Both	  the	   existence	   of	   many	   intermediaries,	   each	   with	   different	   roles	   to	   play,	   and	   their	  subjective	   decisions	   on	   risk	   pricing	   obscure	   the	   overall	   price	   setting.	   Many	   financial	  products	   are	   based	   on	   gearing	  mechanisms,	  mixing	   up	   low	   own	   savings	   levels	  with	   a	  high	   level	   of	   borrowings.	   Therefore	   there	   are	   many	   prices	   for	   money,	   which	   are	   not	  based	  on	  supply	  and	  demand	  but	  based	  on	  subjective	  risk	  assessments.	  	  The	  regulatory	  framework	  also	  complicates	  the	  picture.	  The	  Fed,	  the	  state	  bank’s	  and	  the	  security	  markets	   regulators	  all	   take	  responsibility	   for	  overseeing	  a	  part	  of	   the	  banking	  and	  security	  organizations.	  On	   top	  of	   this	   the	  Fed	  sets	   its	  base	   interest	  rates	  and	  since	  2008	  it	  decided	  to	  enlarge	  the	  volume	  of	  money	  in	  circulation,	   through	  its	  quantitative	  easing	  programs.	  	  The	   real	   element	   that	   sets	   money	   apart	   from	   all	   other	   goods	   and	   services	   is	   that	   in	  acquiring	  such	  other	  goods	  and	  services	  a	  price	  is	  set	  which	  reflect	  costs	  and	  profit	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  margins.	   The	   price	   of	   such	   goods	   and	   services	   are	   based	   on	   known	   factors.	   Of	   course	  investments	  in	  capital	  goods,	  which	  require	  a	  number	  of	  years	  to	  earn	  their	  capital	  input	  back,	  may	  lead	  to	  some	  errors	  in	  judgment	  about	  how	  fast	  such	  earnings	  may	  come	  in.	  	  	  In	   the	  case	  of	  money	  the	   future	   is	  unknown.	  Whether	   it	  concerns	   the	  available	   level	  of	  savings,	  the	  costs	  of	  borrowing,	  the	  future	  repayment	  abilities,	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  and	   the	   regulatory	   restrictions	   put	   on	   banks	   and	   other	   financial	   institutions,	   no	   clear	  guidance	   can	   be	   found	   from	   current	   data.	   Therefore	   the	   current	   price(s)	   of	   money	  provide	  no	  guidance	  to	  future	  developments.	  	  The	  occurrence	  of	   the	  2007-­‐2008	   financial	   crisis	  was	  mainly	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  bank	  profits	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  crisis	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  risks	  that	  had	  been	  taken.	  The	  crisis	  was	   aggravated	   by	   the	   packaging	   and	   sales	   of	   (doubtful)	   mortgage	   risks	   to	   outside	  investors.	  It	  was	  also	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  appropriate	  action	  by	  the	  financial	  regulators	  to	  act	  when	  the	  danger	  signs	  were	  up	  and	  running.	  	  In	   a	   paper:	   “Debts	   should	   come	   with	   a	   serious	   economic	   health	   warning!”1,	   it	   was	  explained	   that	   in	   the	   U.S.	   over	   the	   period	   1997-­‐2007,	   the	   volume	   of	   home	  mortgages	  granted	   far	   exceeded	   the	   need	   for	   funds.	   The	   U.S.	   has	   a	   finite	   need;	   it	   needs	   to	   build	  about	  1.8	  million	  homes	  annually	   for	   its	  growing	  population	  and	   for	   its	  changes	   in	   the	  type	  of	  desired	  family	  residences.	   In	  the	  paper	   it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  is	  closely	   related	   to	   the	   growth	   in	   average	   household	   incomes.	   The	   paper	   demonstrated	  that	  the	  supply	  of	  funds	  was	  excessive	  already	  starting	  in	  1998	  and	  it	  continued	  all	  the	  way	  to	  2007.	  	  	  Why	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  and	  the	  actual	  supply	  of	  funds?	  The	  need	  for	  funds	  is	  and	  should	  be	  related	  to	  the	  growth	  in	  household’s	  income	  levels.	  It	  is	  based	  on	   long-­‐term	  affordability	   levels.	  The	  need	   for	   funds	   reflects	  a	  demand	   level	   for	  funds,	   which	   U.S.	   individual	   households	   can	   collectively	   afford	   to	   service	   out	   of	   their	  incomes	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  	  The	  supply	  of	  home	  mortgage	  funds	  is	  influenced	  by	  a	  series	  of	  other	  factors.	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  http://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/65647/	  2	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/POL040815B.htm	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Secondly	  banks	  are	  profit-­‐based	  organizations.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  2001	  the	  Fed	  lowered	  its	  base	  rate	  from	  6%	  on	  January	  3	  2001	  to	  1.75%	  on	  December	  the	  11th	  of	  the	  same	  year.	  This	  was	  done,	  among	  other	  considerations,	  as	  a	  consequence	   of	   the	   dot.com	   bubble	   that	   caused	   investors	   to	   lose	   some	   $5	   trillion	   in	  savings	  values.	  	  What,	   in	   2002,	   did	   this	   interest	   rate	   picture	   do	   to	   the	   reported	   profit	   levels	   of	   banks	  involved	  in	  mortgage	  lending?	  U.S.	  banks,	  but	  also	  banks	  in	  general,	  report	  their	  profits	  on	  a	  quarterly	  or	  semi-­‐annual	  basis.	  Net	  interest	  income	  is	  set	  off	  against	  the	  provisions	  for	   doubtful	   debtors	   as	   experienced	   over	   the	   period.	  When	   interest	   rates	   dropped	   as	  substantially	   as	   they	   did	   in	   2001,	   in	   2002	   the	   banks’	   credit	   risks	   over	   their	   home	  mortgage	   customer	   base	  were	   perceived	   to	   be	   lower.	   Unchanged	   incomes	   can	   absorb	  higher	   mortgage	   amounts	   when	   interest	   rates	   are	   reduced.	   Secondly	   the	   values	   of	  existing	  homes	  were	  growing	  rapidly,	  which	  improved	  the	  loan	  to	  value	  rates.	  As	  a	  result	  over	   2002,	   U.S.	   banks	   reported	   strongly	   improved	   net	   income	   levels	   from	   the	   home	  mortgage	  product	  line.	  	  Under	   these	   circumstances	  would	  U.S.	   banks	  have	  been	   induced	   to	   sell	  more	  or	   fewer	  home	  mortgages	   in	   later	  years?	  The	  growth	  in	  the	  annual	  volume	  of	  outstanding	  home	  mortgages	  showed	  that	  banks	  sold	  higher	  and	  higher	  volumes	  of	  mortgage	   loans.	  Over	  the	  years	  2002-­‐2007	  the	  U.S.	  Balance	  Sheet	  of	  Households	  and	  Nonprofit	  Organizations3	  demonstrates	  this	   fact	  eloquently.	  For	   instance	  in	  2005	  the	  net	   increase	  in	  outstanding	  U.S.	  mortgage	   financing	  had	  grown	  by	  35%	  as	   compared	   to	  2002.	   In	  2006	   it	  was	  49%	  above	   the	   level	   of	   2002.	   One	   should	   note	   that	   in	   2002	   the	   increase	   in	   outstanding	  mortgage	  amounts	  was	  in	  itself	  3.9	  times	  the	  1997	  level.	  	  The	  banks’	  profit	  motives	  drove	  the	  lending	  machine	  further	  and	  further	  away	  from	  the	  equilibrium	  position,	  which	  would	   have	   been	   that	   over	   the	   years	   1997-­‐2007	   incomes,	  mortgage	  loans	  and	  house	  prices	  should	  have	  grown	  more	  or	  less	  in	  tandem.	  	  Over	  this	  period,	  borrowed	  money	  was	  used	  to	  a	  larger	  and	  larger	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  annual	   mortgage	   borrowing	   levels	   to	   inflate	   house	   prices	   faster	   than	   the	   growth	   in	  average	  household	   incomes.	  Added	  to	  this	  was	  the	  aspect	  of	  home	  equity	  withdrawals.	  Especially	  over	  the	  period	  2005-­‐2007	  major	  home	  equity	  withdrawals	  took	  place.	  	  
Thirdly	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  that	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Fed’s	  interest	  rates	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  ability	  of	   individual	  households	   to	  support	   the	  servicing	  of	   their	  outstanding	  mortgage	  debt.	  	  	  In	   the	   above	   example	   of	   the	   2002	   bank	   profit	   picture,	   the	   fact	   of	   the	   substantially	  lowered	  base	   interest	   rates	  per	   end	  of	   2001	   encouraged	  bankers	   and	  Fannie	  Mae	   and	  Freddy	  Mac	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  larger	  volume	  of	  home	  mortgages	  in	  2002	  and	  later	  years.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-­‐5.pdf	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1.3	  The	  equilibrium	  position	  
	  The	  need	  for	  mortgage	  funds	  –the	  demand	  level	  of	  funds-­‐	  should	  be	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  required	   number	   of	   new	   homes	   to	   be	   built	   and	   on	   the	   growth	   in	   income	   levels.	   Such	  demand	  is	  based	  on	  physical	  needs:	  the	  need	  for	  shelter	  and	  on	  financial	  needs;	  the	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  service	  outstanding	  debt	  out	  of	  incomes,	  irrespective	  of	  changes	  in	  interest	  rates	  and	  irrespective	  of	  the	  levels	  of	  funds	  available	  in	  the	  financial	  markets.	  	  In	   the	   above	   quoted	   paper	   it	   was	   shown	   that	   1997	  was	   the	   year	   that	   the	   increase	   in	  mortgage	  amounts	  was	  sufficient	  to	  fund	  all	  new	  homes	  at	  a	  price	  below	  the	  prevailing	  median	  house	  prices.	  What	  happened	  in	  the	  subsequent	  period	  is	  illustrated	  in	  table	  1.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  The	  need	  for	  home	  mortgage	  funds	  in	  the	  period	  1997-­‐2008	  	  	  	  	  	  Year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Actual	  Increase	  in	  Mortgage	  	  Amounts	  x	  U.S.	  $billion	  
Actual	  	  Housing	  Starts	  per	  1July	  (ann.)	  x	  million	  
Needed	  Housing	  	  Starts	  x	  million	  
Annual	  CPI	  Inflation	  %	   Median	  House	  Prices	  (1July)	  Based	  on	  CPI	  x	  U.S.$	  
Increase	  in	  Mortgage	  Funds	  Needed	  x	  U.S.	  $billion	  1997	   	  	  180	   1.437	   1.8	   	   145,900	   	  1998	   	  	  301	   1.698	   1.8	   1.6	   148,234	   267	  1999	   	  	  377	   1.699	   1.8	   2.2	   151,495	   273	  2000	   	  	  382	   1.463	   1.8	   3.4	   156,645	   282	  2001	   	  	  509	   1.670	   1.8	   2.8	   161,031	   290	  2002	   	  	  706	   1.655	   1.8	   1.6	   163,607	   294	  2003	   	  	  881	   1.897	   1.8	   2.3	   167,370	   301	  2004	   	  	  950	   2.002	   1.8	   2.7	   171,889	   309	  2005	   1,053	   2.054	   1.8	   3.4	   177,733	   320	  2006	   	  	  998	   1.737	   1.8	   3.2	   183,420	   330	  2007	   	  	  701	   1.354	   1.8	   2.9	   188,739	   340	  2008	   	  	  -­‐	  32	   	  	  .923	   1.8	   3.8	   195,911	   353	  	  	  Table	  1	  compares	  actual	  lending	  levels	  with	  actual	  housing	  starts	  on	  an	  annualized	  basis.	  It	   also	   establishes	   the	   increase	   in	  mortgage	   funds	  needed	  on	  basis	   of	   the	  CPI	   inflation	  levels	   -­‐as	   an	   approximate	   for	   the	   growth	   in	   average	   income	   levels-­‐	   and	  of	   the	  median	  house	  prices.	  1997	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  base	  year	  as	  the	  increase	  in	  mortgage	  amounts	  in	  1997	  were	  more	  than	  sufficient	  to	  fund	  all	  new	  housing	  starts	  in	  the	  same	  year,	  based	  on	  the	  median	  house	  prices	  of	  that	  year.	  	  In	  table	  1	  the	  supply	  of	  funds	  to	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  need	  for	  funds.	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  Free	  markets	  in	  money:	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms©Drs	  KeesDe	  Koning	  	  Over	   the	  period	  1997-­‐2007	   table	   1	   shows	   the	   growing	   gap	  between	   the	   actual	   supply	  levels	  of	  home	  mortgages	  and	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  (demand	  levels)	  based	  on	  the	  average	  income	  growth	  levels	  and	  the	  physical	  need	  for	  shelter.	  The	  latter	  may,	  in	  practice,	  vary	  slightly	   from	   year	   to	   year,	   but	   it	   has	   remained	   close	   to	   the	   1.8	  million	   of	   new	   homes	  needed	  based	  on	  population	  growth	  and	  on	  preferred	  types	  of	  homes.	  	  What	   has	   been	   surprising	   was	   that	   financial	   regulators	   put	   so	   much	   emphasis	   on	   the	  supply	  side	  of	  home	  mortgage	  funds.	  This	  was	  at	  the	  detriment	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  need	  for	  funds	   approach.	   	   The	   regulators	   chose	   to	   leave	   banks	   and	   other	   financial	   services	  companies	  alone	  in	  their	  supply	  of	   funds,	  all	   the	  way	  till	  breaking	  point.	   In	  doing	  so	  the	  weaker	  groups	  in	  society:	  individual	  households	  at	  low	  and	  median	  incomes,	  who	  needed	  a	  mortgage	  to	  get	  on	  the	  housing	  ladder,	  suffered	  the	  consequences.	  	  If	  the	  U.S.	  had	  followed	  the	  “need	  for	  funds”	  approach,	  it	  would	  most	  likely	  have	  avoided	  the	  U.S.	  experience	  as	  it	  did	  turn	  out.	  	  	  In	   his	   book:	   “The	   Great	   Deformation”4	  David	   Stockman	   states	   that	   some	   senior	   U.S	  government	   and	   Fed	   officials	   were	   in	   denial	   that	   the	   excessive	   house	   price	   increases	  were	   undermining	   the	   solidity	   of	   the	   U.S.	   banking	   system,	   even	   close	   to	   the	   financial	  crisis	  of	  2007-­‐2008.	  The	  prevailing	  view	  was	  that	  such	  housing	  bubble	  was	  good	  for	  the	  economy,	  rather	  than	  detrimental.	  	  Over	   the	  period	  2002-­‐2007,	   the	   free	  markets	   in	  money	  –the	  supply	  side-­‐	  created	   their	  own	   self-­‐destruction	   in	   that	   risks	   to	   the	   overall	   economy	   were	   not	   priced	   into	   the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  banks	  were	  operating.	  Such	  circumstances	  were	  a	  relatively	  low	  interest	  rate	  environment	  and	  rising	  house	  prices	  exceeding	  income	  growth	  levels.	  The	   “invisible	   hand”	   of	   Adam	   Smith	   did	   not,	   does	   not	   and	   cannot	   operate	   in	   the	   free	  markets	  for	  money.	  Bankers,	  including	  all	  those	  working	  in	  financial	  services,	  were,	  and	  too	   a	   large	   extent	   still	   are,	   guided	  by	  making	  more	  money	   for	   their	   organizations	   and	  implicitly	  for	  themselves	  based	  on	  profit	  level	  assessments	  that	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  longer-­‐term	  economic	  dangers	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  effects	  of	  letting	  banks	  get	  away	  with	  excessive	  mortgage	  lending	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.1	  The	  economic	  and	  social	  effects	  
	   Over	   the	  period	  2006-­‐2013	  22.1	  million	  households	   faced	   foreclosure	  proceedings	  over	  their	  home	  loans.	  This	  equals	  more	  than	  one	  out	  of	  every	  six	  U.S.	  households.	  5.8	  million	  homes	  were	  repossessed,	  affecting	  one	  out	  of	  every	  8-­‐mortgage	  holder.	  Over	  the	  period	  January	   2008-­‐	   October	   2009	   7.8	   million	   Americans	   lost	   their	   jobs.	   In	   2013	   the	   real	  median	  household	   income	  was	  8%	   lower	   than	   the	  2007	  pre-­‐recession	   level	  of	   $56,435.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   lowering	  of	   interest	  rates	   to	  historically	   its	   lowest	   level,	   individual	  households	  reduced	  their	  outstanding	  mortgage	  portfolio	  by	  $1.24	  trillion	  or	  11.7%	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  Great	  Deformation	  by	  David	  A.	  Stockman,	  ISBN	  978-­‐1-­‐58648-­‐912-­‐0	  (HC)	  March	  2013,	  Public	  Affairs,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Perseus	  Books	  Group.	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  Free	  markets	  in	  money:	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms©Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  	  the	  period	  2008-­‐first	  quarter	  2015.	  The	  U.S.	  government	  (Federal,	  State	  and	  local)	  saw	  its	  tax	  revenues	  drop	  by	  $1.5	  trillion	  or	  29%	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2009.	  In	  the	  paper:	  “Debts	  should	   come	   with	   a	   serious	   economic	   health	   warning”	   it	   was	   calculated	   that	   between	  2008	   and	   2014	   the	   “economic	   costs”	   of	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   was	   an	   increase	   in	  government	  debt	  per	  capita	  of	  $24,267	  or	  in	  total	  an	  additional	  government	  debt	  of	  $7.7	  trillion.	  	  	  One	  should	  put	  these	  figures	  in	  perspective.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  “needs	  for	  funds”	  approach	  was	  not	  applied	  led	  over	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2014	  (fiscal	  years)	  to	  an	  extra	  debt	  for	  all	  U.S.	  citizens	   of	   $7.7	   trillion.	   The	   total	   level	   of	   outstanding	   mortgages	   was	   $10.5	   trillion	   in	  2007.	  	  	  	  
3.	  The	  needs	  for	  funds	  approach.	  	  	  For	  the	  future,	  the	  economic	  debate	  should	  explore	  policy	  options	  for	  implementing	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  rather	  than	  having	  banks	  run	  the	  supply	  side.	  	  Each	   individual	   household	   taking	   out	   a	   mortgage	   adds	   to	   the	   volume	   of	   mortgages	  outstanding.	   	   While	   the	   demand	   level	   for	   mortgage	   funds	   is	   based	   on	   an	   individual	  choice,	   the	   annual	   total	   volume	   is	   based	   on	   a	   collective	   choice.	   All	   individuals	   have	   to	  guess	  what	  their	  income	  situation	  is	  going	  be	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come.	  Home	  mortgages	  are	  long-­‐term	  commitments.	  	  The	  supply	  side	  of	  funds	  works	  with	  different	  parameters:	  the	  volume	  of	  funds	  available	  for	  lending,	  prevailing	  interest	  rates	  and	  actual	  house	  price	  levels	  as	  well	  as	  the	  desire	  to	  maximize	  profits.	  The	  latter	  is	  a	  typical	  short-­‐term	  consideration	  as	  profits	  are	  reported	  on	   a	   quarterly,	   semi-­‐annual	   and	   annual	   basis.	   The	   supply	   side	   is	   also	   based	   on	  competition	   levels	  between	   financial	   institutions.	  Competition	  may	   lower	   the	   available	  interest	  rates	  somewhat,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  slow	  down	  lending	  when	  required.	  	  The	  two	  variables	  in	  the	  need	  for	  funds	  approach	  are	  the	  fixed	  need	  for	  shelter	  -­‐based	  on	  population	  growth	  levels	  and	  the	  preferences	  in	  dwelling	  patterns-­‐	  and	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  income	   growth	   levels	   in	   line	   with	   outstanding	   mortgage	   debt	   levels	   and	   house	   price	  developments.	  	  As	  table	  1	   illustrates	  the	  needs	  for	   funds	  was	  far	  exceeded	  by	  the	  supply	  of	   funds	  over	  the	   period	   1998-­‐2007.	  No	   equilibrium	   could	   ever	   be	   found	   as	   the	   supply	   side	   did	   not	  consider	  the	  long	  term	  consequences	  of	  its	  parameters	  and	  many	  of	  the	  regulators	  were	  of	   the	   opinion	   that	   more	   debt	   led	   to	   higher	   economic	   growth	   rates,	   rather	   than	  considering	  sustainable	  levels	  of	  outstanding	  debt	  in	  line	  with	  income	  growth	  patterns.	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3.1	  Spotting	  the	  danger	  point	  	  Banks	  call	   their	  mortgage	   loan	  portfolios	  sound	  when	  their	  customer	  base	  repays	  such	  loans	  according	  to	  the	  loan	  schedules	  agreed	  to.	  However	  macro-­‐economically	  speaking	  	  one	   can	   define	   a	   mortgage	   loan	   portfolio	   as	   unstable	   and	   thereby	   a	   threat	   to	   future	  economic	   growth	   rates	   when	   households’	   income	   growth	   levels	   are	   exceeded	   by	   the	  changes	  in	  the	  price	  levels	  of	  homes.	  	  In	   the	   U.S.	   such	   turning	   point	  was	   reached	   in	   2002.	   The	   “supply	   side”	   provided	   $706	  billion	  in	  additional	  funds	  to	  the	  home	  mortgage	  market.	  The	  “need	  for	  funds”	  approach	  would	  have	  used	  only	  $294	  billion	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  its	  objective	  of	  starting	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  in	  line	  with	  the	  growth	  in	  income	  levels	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  CPI	  index.	  The	  “overfunding”	   level	   amounted	   to	   $412	   billion.	   2002	  was	   the	   first	   year	   that	  more	   than	  50%	  of	   the	   supply	   of	   funds	  was	   in	   excess	   of	   the	   need	   for	   funds.	   Such	   type	   of	   funding	  leads	  to	  house	  price	  inflation	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  household	  incomes.	  It	  reflects	  a	  financing	  pattern	  that	  is	  self-­‐destructive.	  If	  continued	  –and	  it	  did	  continue	  to	  2007-­‐	  the	  housing	  boom	  (in	  prices	  only)	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  housing	  bust	  with	  all	  negative	  implications.	  	  The	  year	  2002	  was	  well	  before	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  sales	  efforts	  started.	  The	  latter	  started	  in	  all	  seriousness	  from	  2004	  onwards.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  narrow	  definition	  of	  “sound”	  levels	  of	  debt	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  its	  macro-­‐economic	  definition	  lies	  in	  the	  threat	  of	  future	  defaults	  and	  their	   subsequent	   consequences.	   Banks	   have	   a	   short-­‐term	   profit	   motive	   and	   any	  household	   able	   to	   repay	   according	   to	   the	   agreed	   repayment	   schedule	   is	   regarded	   as	  sound	  as	  no	   loan	   loss	  provisions	  need	   to	  be	  made.	  Profits	  are	  maximized	   for	   the	  short	  term.	  Macro-­‐economically	  the	  fact	  that	  income	  growth	  and	  house	  price	  growth	  levels	  are	  on	  divergent	   tracks	   should	   lead	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   such	   a	  pattern	   is	   unsustainable	  and	   therefore	   action	   is	   needed.	   Short	   term	   banking	   profits	   and	   long-­‐term	   economic	  stability	  deviate.	  Financial	  markets	  provide	  the	  wrong	  profit	  signals	  for	  future	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  
	  
3.2	  Acting	  upon	  the	  danger	  point	  
	  To	   provide	   macro-­‐economic	   guidance	   is	   not	   the	   task	   of	   an	   individual	   bank	   or	   other	  financial	   institution	   or	   of	   individual	   households.	   Such	   task	   clearly	   belongs	   to	   the	  regulators:	  the	  Fed,	  the	  state	  bank	  regulators	  and	  the	  security	  ones.	  	  What	  the	  Fed	  had	  done	  in	  2001	  was	  to	  lower	  its	  base	  rate	  from	  6%	  at	  the	  beginning	  to	  1.75%	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  2002	  was	  the	  year	  of	  the	  danger	  point.	  Could	  it	  be	  that	  a	  uniform	  lowering	  of	   the	  base	   interest	  rate	  (or	  raising	  ones	  as	  was	  done	  over	   the	  years	  2005-­‐2007	  from	  a	  level	  of	  2.25%	  to	  5.25%)	  would	  not	  be	  suitable	  for	  all	  the	  three	  main	  borrowing	   groups	   at	   the	   same	   time?	   The	   three	   groups	   are	   the	   U.S.	   government,	   the	  company	  sector	  and	  the	  individual	  households.	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  For	   instance	   the	   lowering	   of	   interest	   rates	   to	   1.75%	   in	   2001	   had	   the	   effect	   of	  encouraging	  more	  home	  mortgage	  borrowing,	  while	  the	  needs	  for	  funds	  approach	  would	  have	   advocated	   a	   slower	   increase	   in	   such	   borrowing.	  On	   the	   other	   hand	   the	   company	  sector	   could	  well	   have	  benefitted	   from	   the	   lower	   rates,	   as	   economic	   growth	   rates	   had	  dropped	  in	  2001-­‐2002.	  	  	  Perhaps	   a	   solution	   is	   to	   take	   actions	   related	   to	   the	   position	   of	   each	   borrowing	   group	  separately.	  	  
Tighten	  lending	  criteria	  	  In	  2002,	  one	  option	  could	  have	  been	  to	  temporarily	  tighten	  the	  lending	  criteria	  for	  banks	  to	  individuals	  wishing	  to	  take	  up	  a	  mortgage.	  Lower	  the	  supply	  side.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  temporarily.	  	  
A	  mortgage	  interest	  stabilization	  scheme	  	  What	   could	   also	   have	   been	   done	   and	   can	   still	   be	   done	   is	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   a	   home	  mortgage	  interest	  stabilization	  scheme.	  The	  average	  income	  growth	  levels	  of	  individual	  households	  do	  not	  move	  from	  6%	  to	  1.75%	  in	  a	  year,	  or	  move	  up	  from	  2.25%	  to	  5.25%	  in	  a	  two-­‐year	  period.	  What	  could	  have	  been	  done	  is	  to	  set	  up	  a	  scheme	  that	  partially	  or	  fully	  eliminates	  the	  variations	  in	  interest	  rates	  for	  individual	  households.	  Stable	  charges	  to	   a	   household’s	   income	   must	   be	   a	   source	   of	   reducing	   overall	   economic	   uncertainty	  levels.	  One	   should	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   lower	   and	  middle	   class	   households	   are	   the	  most	  likely	   to	  have	   to	  borrow	   for	  buying	  a	  home.	  Their	   vulnerability	   to	   swings	   in	  mortgage	  payments	  is	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  higher	  income	  groups.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  the	  Fed	  together	  with	  Freddy	  Mae	  and	  Fanny	  Mac	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  banks	  could	  work	  out	  a	  solution	  for	  this	  problem.	   Ultimately	   the	   costs	   of	   stabilization	   will	   be	   costs	   of	   running	   the	   country	  efficiently.	  In	  other	  words	  such	  costs	  could	  be	  charged	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  budget	  if	  the	   increase	   in	   interest	   charges	  will	   affect	   households	   proportionally	  more	   than	   their	  income	   growth.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   a	   situation	   is	   also	   possible	   that	   households	   keep	  paying	   the	   same	   interest	   charges	   at	   a	   time	   when	   banks’	   costs	   of	   funds	   rates	   have	  dropped.	  In	  this	  case	  a	  positive	  transfer	  should	  be	  made	  to	  the	  government.	  	  The	  scheme	  basically	  helps	  the	  lower	  income	  classes	  to	  avoid	  important	  swings	  in	  their	  costs	   of	  mortgages.	   The	   lower	   income	   groups	   have	   to	   pay	  mortgage	   costs	   out	   of	   their	  wages	  and	  salaries.	  For	  the	  savings	  classes,	  the	  more	  wealthy	  in	  society,	  their	  income	  out	  of	   savings	   is	  usually	   in	  addition	   to	   income	  out	  of	  work.	  Fluctuations	   in	  savings	   income	  are	  usually	  more	  easily	  absorbed.	  	  	  
4	  Some	  conclusions	  
	  
• Money	  cannot	  be	  priced	  at	  historic	  costs,	   like	   for	  ordinary	  goods	  and	  services;	  therefore	   profits	   made	   on	   home	   mortgages	   by	   financial	   institutions	   are	   no	  guidance	  to	  future	  losses.	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• The	  freedoms	  left	  to	  U.S.	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  collective	   level	  of	  outstanding	  mortgages	  –the	  mortgage	   supply	   side-­‐	  bears	  no	  resemblance	   to	   the	   risks	   run	   by	   individual	   households.	   The	   latter,	   especially	  those	  of	  the	  lower	  and	  medium	  income	  groups,	  may	  lose	  their	  homes	  or	  jobs	  or	  both	  in	  case	  the	  financial	  fraternity	  lends	  too	  fast.	  	  
• The	  “needs	  for	  funds”	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  two	  types	  of	  needs.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  need	  for	  shelter,	  which	  in	  the	  U.S.	  requires	  about	  1.8	  million	  new	  housing	  starts	  per	  annum.	  Such	  need	  is	  based	  on	  population	  growth	  and	  on	  preferred	  changes	  in	  the	  quality	  and	  size	  of	  homes.	  The	  second	  need	  is	  to	  keep	  house	  prices	  more	  or	   less	   in	   line	  with	   the	   income	   growth	  patterns	   of	   the	   borrowing	   households,	  usually	  the	  lower	  and	  medium	  income	  groups.	  Long-­‐term	  stability	  in	  incomes	  is	  related	  to	  long-­‐term	  stability	  in	  mortgage	  debt	  servicing.	  	  
• The	  costs	  of	  not	  following	  the	  “needs	  for	  funds”	  approach	  have	  had	  very	  serious	  economic	  and	  social	  implications.	  The	  great	  pressure	  to	  repay	  was	  illustrated	  by	  the	   22.1	   million	   households	   facing	   foreclosure	   proceedings;	   the	   5.8	   million	  home	   repossessions;	   the	   7.8	   million	   losing	   their	   jobs;	   the	   lowering	   of	   real	  median	   income	   levels;	   the	   $7.7	   trillion	   additional	   U.S.	   government	   debt	  incurred,	  which	  is	  $24,267	  per	  each	  American.	  	  
• The	  real	  conclusion	  out	  of	  the	  above	  is	  that	  the	  “need	  for	  funds”	  approach	  –the	  demand	   for	   funds	   based	   on	   required	   home	   building	   levels	   and	   on	   long-­‐term	  ability	   to	   repay	   outstanding	  mortgages-­‐	   is	   the	   only	   solution	   to	  maintain	   long-­‐	  term	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  It	  favors	  the	  customers	  rather	  than	  the	  suppliers;	  it	  favors	  the	  low	  and	  medium	  income	  groups	  over	  the	  financial	  institutions	  	  	  Drs	  Kees	  De	  Koning	  Chorleywood	  U.K.	  14th	  August	  2015	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